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Election Notice 2026 Primary
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Observation Questions

Observation question submissions for the 2026 Primary Election are now closed.

2026 Primary Election Questions and Answers

For the 2026 Primary Election, detailed or at-length observation questions are required to be submitted using the official question form. Responses will be provided as resources and operational timelines allow, usually within 72 hours. Acceptance and processing of submitted questions are subject to review by the Registrar of Voters’ Office.

Questions and answers submitted during the 2026 Primary Election.

Submitter & Date

Question Answer
Valerie W. 5/15/2026 Describe in detail the chain of custody process that will be used to transport the ballots printed at the ICX stations then delivered to the ROV processing room? Which vote center staff will remove the ballots and complete the chain of custody documents? What is the schedule for removing the ICP tank's ballots be transferred to boxes? What documentation will be completed when the ICP ballots are removed from the tank, and who will be signing the documentation? How will the ICP ballots be secured before leaving the vote center? Who will transport the ICP ballots to the ROV processing room? Where will the ICP ballots be stored securely? Would you please describe which type of ballots will go where on the cage shelving? It's important to know which area will hold the various types of ballots meaning already scanned, waiting to be scanned, ballots needing duplication, undeliverables, etc. The shelving areas are obviously not visible from the fishtank. The labeling on the front of the shelving is not visible from the wall cameras. The cage is essentially unobservable. It is not meaningful to simply see a body in the cage but have no observation regarding which ballots are being accessed. Why are the already scanned ballots not sealed after the batches have been scanned? At the end of each night, Vote Center Manager/Assistant Managers will unloads the vote center scanner boxes of ballots and fill out the chain of custody document. Ballots are secured in a sealed box, and will be transported back by Ballot Runners/Managers/Assistant Managers to the Central Counting Place. Vote Center paper ballots are stored in on the north side of the cage (against the fence). On the south side, ballots are stored starting from the eastern section extending towards the western section depending on the step of the process they are in. The north center of the cage shelves are dedicated to envelopes from extracted verified ballots or undeliverable envelopes. The south center of the cage shelves is dedicated to scanned mail ballots. The west side wall of the cage is dedicated to provisional ballots, while the east side wall of the cage is dedicated to discrepant ballots. Central Counting Place ballots are not sealed because of the access needed for staff's periodic audits.
Briana F. 5/15/2026 Between 4:15p - 4:45p in tabulation room there were 2-3 people working with a laptop at workstation #3. What procedure were they completing? What were the devices used (ibutton) and for what purpose? The laptop - does it move in and out of the tabulation room? Does that laptop leave processing floor? Does that laptop leave county building and if so where does it travel to? ROV Staff entered the tabulation room to setup the election file from the Election Management System EMS onto the scanners within the central counting place. The ibuttons are used to access the EMS. ROV staff only used the laptop to view instructions on this process. Please note the laptop is not affiliated with the EMS nor was/is connected to the EMS, as it is a county laptop assigned to that staff member.
Roblyn W. 5/18/2026 What do the green and orange badges indicate? The badges worn by election worker staff in the Central Counting Place indicate that person’s current registered political party. REP - Pink, DEM - Light Blue, NP - Yellow, Green - All Others.
Roblyn W. 5/18/2026 Once the ballots that have returned undeliverable or return to sender labels are noted in the signature verification/bluecrest machines, how are the ballots stored and who removes them from the rolls? Undeliverable ballots are labeled as such and stored in the ballot cage on shelves that specify they are undeliverable. After the election, the undeliverable ballots are used as reason to initiate the process to inactive the voter pursuant to NRS 293.530.
Briana F. 5/18/2026 The laptop-does it move in and out of the Tabulation Room? Does that laptop leave the processing floor? Does that laptop leave county building and if so where does it travel to? Additional questions relating to your response and my observations on 5/15/2026: This laptop, you are describing, does it have wi-fi capability or has the ability to communicate without cable connections? Is this laptop assigned specifically to the gentleman who was working on it on Friday, 5/15/2026? As it is a county laptop assigned to that staff member, it does indeed move in and out of the tabulation room, leave the processing floor, and may travel with the staff member. Yes, it is Wi-Fi capable and connected to the employee internet and yes, it is specifically assigned to that staff member.
Pam S. 5/18/2026 Exactly how is manual signature verification completed? Should we see 2 people at one computer screen together or do they do it seperately. If we can't see 2 people doing it than there is no way to confirm that 2 people looked at it + that it was a bipartisan process. Once a ballot arrives to manual signature verification, a bi-partisan team reviews the digital capture of the signature on the ballot and compares it to any signature available within the voter's registration. If the bi-partisan team does not agree, a permanent ROV staff member assists in breaking the tie. If it matches, it is accepted and processed. If it does not match, it is challenged and requires a cure.
Roblyn W. 5/20/2026 How does the bluecrest sorter connect with the voter registration system? The Bluecrest sorter is connected via wire to the "overseer" station on the opposite end of the central counting place. There, staff export data from the sorter onto the workstation - the data will then be uploaded via an FTP to the VREMS system. Data from the VREMS system is pulled via the FTP and is provided back to the sorter. This is done throughout the day as mail ballot envelopes are run through the sorter.
Briana F. 5/21/26 Yesterday, 5/20/26 approximately 10am, a small group went into the tabulation room. What tasks were they performing? Who were they? Is the bluecrest sorter verifying signatures and if so at what percentage accuracy? Are any ballots being sorted by hand? Where online are observer questions posted? ROV Staff entered the tabulaton room to prepare the EMS and conduct the portion of Pre-Logic and Accuracy testing that takes place within the central counting place. Our Bluecrest sorter has Automatic Signature Verification enabled - a software that compares the signature to signatures on the voter's file and assigns it a "confidence score". The ROV has set the sorter to automatically signature verify any signatures that meet or are above a 72 confidence score. Ballot envelopes that have trouble being sorted, mostly due to being bent/damaged/soiled, are hand-checked in. Observer question submissions are posted online at washoecounty.gov/voters under the Observation section.
Roblyn W. 5/23/2026 Area under "counting board" sign, one worker at the table 4:17pm - I watched a woman doing what looks like extraction. She is removing ballots from one envelope and placing into a second envelope. The first goes into a bin, then into a pile. Is she doing hand extraction? Why taking from one envelope and then placing in a second? Are these mail in ballots? What happens to these ballots next? Wondering also if she is staff and allowed what I think is an iPhone. This was a staff member processing EASE/UOCAVA duplicated materials. When something has to be duplicated, the original document must be labeled, sealed, and stored. These original materials are no longer apart of the process, while the duplicated ballot is prepared for scanning. In your specific scenario, a staff member removed a UOCAVA paper printed ballot from its original envelope, and stored it in a duplicated ballot envelope. Staff are allowed to have their phones on their persons, though we recommend them to leave their personal phones elsewhere before entering the Central Counting Place. Personal phones are not allowed to be used, while County assigned phones are allowed to be used.
Valerie W. 5/24/2026 Is there anything that can be done to address the air quality and temperature in the Elections Department Observation Room? This containment room is neither safe nor comfortable for observers and hasn't been since its construction. There is no fresh air circulation in the room. Air from outside the room only enters when the single entry door briefly opens to let someone enter or exit. Per the Registrar’s rules, the door cannot be left open or even cracked, so the room's air remains completely sealed. The HVAC ceiling register doesn't appear to be functional. In the many hours I've observed while restricted to the room without windows, I've never felt air moving out of the register. I attempted to catch your eye last night when you were in the processing room, so you could verify that the temperature inside the observation room was too warm. You didn't respond. Earlier, I had also asked "Zach" to ask you to come to the observation room. You didn't over the entire evening. I’m attaching a photo I took at about 8:15 p.m. on May 23, 2026, showing the thermometer reading in the room - 78-80 degrees F. I brought the thermometer with me to specifically document the air and temperature conditions since the air quality and temperature in the Observation Room have been uncomfortable for far too long over several elections. This is not a single event. The temperature held steady at that high level for hours. I was present in the room from roughly 5:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., and another observer stayed even longer—from about 2:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. Only the two of us were in the room during that time, but additional observers' bodies raise the temperature even more. None of the machinery in the processing room were used until approximately 8:30 PM, so equipment heat did not cause the issue. Recommended workplace temperatures generally fall between 68°F and 76°F if supplied with fresh air. Good indoor air quality also requires comfortable humidity levels and a steady supply of fresh outdoor air. The Observation Room does not have consistent fresh air available. Also, the HVAC ceiling register never has shown any detectable air movement, fresh-air supply, or temperature regulation during any of my visits to observe ballot processing during any election. I've kept fruitlessly hoping that the observation room's air and temperature issues would be addressed. I'm finally requesting action. Expecting observers to remain in that environment for any period of time is unreasonable and inconsiderate. It raises the question: Is Registrar Andrew Macdonald unintentionally (or intentionally) discouraging public oversight of ballot processing or attempting to limit transparency? Your prompt attention to this matter and any steps taken to improve ventilation and temperature control in the room will be appreciated. Please let me know if you need additional information or photos. The Central Counting Place experiences increases in temperature due to machinery operated and amount of staff present within the room. The ballot processing floor and the observation booth are subject to the same temperature conditions, and the HVAC is functioning in both rooms. We are aware of the increases in temperature over the weekend due to the volume of work being done, and will continue to do our best to accomodate both staff and observers. While I (the Public Information Officer) do my best to be available to discuss with observers, other duties require my focus during the election and there should be no expectation that I am able to be summoned to the observation area at any moment's notice. As always, myself and Registrar McDonald encourage the public to observe the process.
Valerie W. 5/25/2026 Please provide the following information regarding mechanical devices to be tested for this 2026 Primary Election (NRS293B.150, NRS293B.155, NRS293B.165, NRS293B.170): 1) Names and party affiliation of the accuracy certification board (ACB). 2) Name of the individual who is not an employee of the county or city. 3) Were all members of the ACB present to observe all testing? 4) Please provide the date and time when the testing began. 5) Which employee(s) under the supervision of Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald conducted the testing? 6) Please provide the date and time when testing concluded. 7) Will all scanners presently located in the Ballot Processing Room be used in this 2026 Primary? 8) Have all scanners to be used in the 2026 Primary been tested? 9) Did all devices successfully pass the testing? If not, how many did not pass? Please identify the specific device(s) that did not pass. 10) Did the ACB members sign any documentation regarding the testing completion and accuracy? If so, please provide a copy of the document. Please indicate the date and time the documents were signed by the ACB member. If voters are to believe that the ACB members are attesting to the accuracy of the testing, citizens deserve to know who is attesting to those facts. Date and time of signing should be documented to comply with NRS regarding the time constraints. Pre-Logic and Accuracy testing began on May 11th at 8am and continued through May 21st until end of day, conducted by Registrar of Voters staff and temporary workers, and Washoe County staff. The certification by our duly appointed Washoe County Elections Accuracy Certification Board took place on May 21st. The 3 certification board members observed the testing operations in the warehouse on May 15th and then observered testing at the Central Counting Place on May 21st. The 3 members of the certification board are Molly Rosen (DEM - City of Reno), Michelle Harper (REP - City of Sparks), and Heidi Howe (NP - Washoe County). As required by NRS 293B.150, all scanners have been tested - and all systems have passed the test.
Roblyn W. 5/25/2026 I see workers at the counting tables bundle 10 envelopes together then use a large black zip tie on them and add a lime green tag to the bundle. Please help me understand what envelopes these are - inner or outer, why are they ziptied, and what happens to them next. The "counting board" is a step within the Life of a Ballot where staff takes account of the ballots and envelopes that were processed through extraction. The materials extracted are evaluated, and a count of ballots ready to pass onto scanning takes place. If the ballot is damaged, or has an identifying mark, it is separated out to the next step required. The envelopes are zip tied, as a form of seal, and stored, while the ballots are batched and prepared to scan.
Briana F. 5/27/26 Today, between 11am-12pm. I saw a staff member on the mail in ballot processing floor, carry a large round key chain with numerous small black rectangular devices that resembled external flash drives. (maybe 5 or 6). This keychain was passed from one staff member to another. What are these devices and what are they used for? Where are they securely stored? Do they travel in and out of the processing floor and If so where? and where are they used outside? Are they used in the ems/tabulation room and for what purpose? Are these devices used to access the election management system. Under what supervision are they used? Access to the voter registration system (otherwise known as VREMS or TotalVote), requires the use of multi factor authentication (MFA). The keychain you saw holds hardware security keys used to log in to the various workstations in the Central Counting Place that access the voter registration system. They are not storage devices, and are not used to access anything within the Election Management System. This keychain is secured within the Central Counting Place. The keychain is used under ROV staff supervision.
Briana F. 5/27/26 Did all scanners pass the pre lat test? What day did the pre lat testing begin and what day was it completed? Can you please provide dates and times? Pre-Logic and Accuracy testing began on May 11th at 8am and continued through May 21st until end of day, conducted by Registrar of Voters staff and temporary workers, and Washoe County staff. The certification by our duly appointed Washoe County Elections Accuracy Certification Board took place on May 21st. The 3 certification board members observed the testing operations in the warehouse on May 15th and then observered testing at the Central Counting Place on May 21st. The 3 members of the certification board are Molly Rosen (DEM - City of Reno), Michelle Harper (REP - City of Sparks), and Heidi Howe (NP - Washoe County). As required by NRS 293B.150, all scanners have been tested - and all systems have passed the test.
Roblyn W. 5/27/2026 Why did two black trays get delivered into the processing room through the staff door to the lobby? Where did they come from? What ballots were they? Where will they processed next? The Registrar's office has a mail ballot drop box in the lobby that is emptied every night and its contents are brought to the Central Counting Place through the office door. These ballots require chain of custody procedures as any other ballot delivery method, and are not treated any differently than other deliveries from other dropboxes or the USPS. The other type of ballots that may flow through the door are "counter ballots", which are simply mail ballots printed in-house at the request of a voter. They sit at the front office to be delivered to the individual, but if they are not picked up by closing those counter ballots must be brought back to be stored within the Central Counting Place until the following day.
Briana F. 5/27/26 1. There seems to be a large number of undeliverable ballots at manual signature verification. I assume these are undeliverable because of the yellow postal sticker on the envelopes. Why would so many come back undeliverable? How many undeliverables have been received as to late? 2. Are members of the media allowed to unpack equipment bags at the ballot sorting table? It looked like today they were setting up next to a black tray. Did that contain ballots? Is media allowed to walk processing floor with large duffle/equipment bags? 3. Is the Bluecrest sorter machine verifying signatures today? If so, what % accuracy is this set to? 4. This morning, the security guard noticed the backdoor to garage was not shut and locked (around 9am). Could you please add a live stream view of the backdoor and please leave lights on 24/7? There were no security guards present in processing room during ballot delivery from post office this morning. 5. The staff member who performed daily maintenance this morning wears a small black rectangular device on his hip. What is this? 6. Could you please turn on the tabulation room lights? 7. I saw someone on processing floor with what looked to be 2 phones in their back pockets. Are personal cell phones allowed on processing floor? Do the county issued phones travel out of the building and home with staff? After the election, the Registrar's office will do an analysis of the factors behind undeliverable ballots received. The current number of undeliverables can be viewed on the NVSOS's dashboard at NVSOS.gov/vivid. Members of the media are given access to the Central Counting Place under close supervision of the ROV's Public Information Officer or other executive staff. Under this close supervision and permission, they are allowed to conduct their business, including utilizing bags to carry equipment and setting equipment down to setup. The Bluecrest sorter has had the Automatic Signature Verification (ASV) software enabled since the start of the election, and the acceptance score threshold, which is not a %, is set at 72. The garage doors within the Central Counting Place are locked 24/7, and the doors you are mentioning are not within the Central Counting Place. Our livestream infrastructure is at capacity, and we are unable to add an additional camera for the 2026 Primary Election. The lights in the Central Counting Place are turned off when no operations are occurring, and some lights are left on to allow for some visibility on the livestream. The device mentioned on an employee's hip is a phone. County work phone usage is allowed in the Central Counting Place, but staff are not to use their personal phones despite still having them in pockets. It is likely that some county staff utilize their county assigned work phones outside of the building.
Roblyn W. 5/27/2026 Party designation is to be noted by colored badges, as well as identify who is in the processing room. Yesterday and the day before I verbally noted to George how few red/republican badges are in the room. In general sometimes 2, often 1, there has been none. Today I am unable to see badges on many in the room, along with those without looking right at us and laughing. This is unprofessional and sets a tone. Is there anything being done to have more representation of republicans in the room? All Central Counting Place operations are conducted in a nonpartisan manner. The Registrar's Office ensures that bipartisan teams are available to perform all statutorily required bipartisan processing throughout the "Life of a Ballot." Beyond those requirements, we strive to include as much partisan representation as possible within the staffing resources available. Staff are required to wear badges within the Central Counting Place; however, employees operating machinery must stow or remove their badges to comply with safety requirements. While I understand your concern that staff may have been laughing at you, conversations occurring within the processing area are not audible from the observer booth, making it difficult to determine the context of any conversation or laughter. Election administration often involves long hours, and our staff try to maintain a jovial and upbeat atmosphere while carrying out their duties. Regardless, all Washoe County employee conduct themselves in accordance with the County's Code of Conduct in respecting observers.
Julie B. 5/30/2026 I was wondering what the 2 people were doing in the EMS room between 10am-11:00am? ROV staff entered the EMS room to access our Secure File Transfer System with the NVSOS’s office to receive our bi-monthly Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) reports. Please note the secure file transfer system, otherwise known as the IPSwitch, is a separate system from the voting system and is not interconnected.
Valerie W. 5/30/2026 Given that the public and ballot processing observers have been told by Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald and Media Specialist George Guthrie that Washoe County’s Election Department staff wear colored badges indicating party affiliation on the NV Voter Registration rolls: Blue=Democrat, Green=Minor parties, Red=Republican, Yellow=Nonpartisan. #1: Why should observers or any member of the public trust or believe that the badge color a worker wears when working in the ballot processing room (BPR) is accurate or true? #2: Do workers sign an affidavit regarding the truth of the badge color they wear? #3: Do supervisors attest to the truthfulness of a worker’s badge color? #4: How can observers or the public know with certainty that workers aren’t simply wearing a badge color for the convenience of supervisors in the BPR who need to give the appearance of bipartisan representation? Voter registrations can be legally changed daily. #5: Is the public being asked to simply “trust the department’s operation” regarding bipartisan representation in the processing of ballots when there is no possibility of verification and no penalties for deceitful workers and/or supervisors? #6: Why is it that since the beginning of public observation during this election that, after approximately 14 days of observation, and approximately 100-125 workers doing work in the BPR throughout these days, less than ~20 Republican election workers total have been observed working in the BPR. Public observers have been watching workers in the BPR for the large majority of processing hours since May 15 either in person or online (YouTube) and have gathered these approximations. *See #1 above regarding no possible verification of the truthfulness of the badge color being worn. Party affiliation is critically important per statute and common sense. “Bipartisan” pairs of Democrat and Nonpartisan workers disenfranchise Republican constituents when ballot duplication, adjudication, signature verification, and more are being done. See #1 above; #7: I’ve previously asked you why Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald has not done more to bring a better balanced representation of the 3 major political parties into the Elections Department BPR. You told me, “Republican county employees willing to do election work (for personal paid time off) are hard to find.” Researching this issue more, I’ve learned via confidential conversations with past/present employees that Republican or conservative employees hide their political party affiliation to avoid harassment and discrimination in the largely Democrat county and city workplace. Your comment and the confidential speakers’ comments align. The public and voters expecting a fair and honest election lose in this situation as a fair and honest election is likely not being conducted given the imbalance of party representation. I’m asking Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald to address this discriminatory and possibly illegal situation that plainly circumvents the intent of legislation regarding bipartisan representation. All Central Counting Place operations are conducted in a nonpartisan manner. The Registrar's office ensures there are available bi-partisan teams to conduct bi-partisan mandated processing within the "Life of a Ballot". Outside of this, we strive to include as much party representation as possible with the staffing resources available. As a courtesy to observers, staff badges are issued accordingly based on the registered party on their voter registration. Workers do not sign an affidavit attesting their affiliation, as this is information directly from their voter registration.
Sean S. 5/30/2026 What is a "Tabulated Ballot" contained in the white boxes from the polling locations? Where are they counted? Ballots cast by voters in-person at vote centers by utilizing the ballot marking devices are collected every night and sealed into the white ballot boxes. These ballots are now a paper audit trail of votes and are stored in the Central Counting Place. When cast at a vote center, the vote is digitized and transported back in SD cards. These digitized votes are counted on election night
Sean S. 5/30/2026 What is the USB device plugged into the "scanning" main computer screen? The blue USB devices you see plugged into the scanning main computer are a physical access key port (iButton). These are utilized for administrative access by staff.
Sean S. 5/30/2026 What was Addi doing on her computer from 8;30pm to 8:54pm with no staff present? That couldn't be done on another computer? Deputy Registrar Addie was conducting end of night data uploads on the workstations utilized for this. Both the Registrar of Voters and the Public Information Officer were present in the room for this.
Roblyn W. 5/31/2026 Two general county staff are seated at the duplication station where ballots are looked at and the staff can duplicate ballots, and fill them out by deciding what "The intension of voter is". They are opening envelopes that are labeling that says "Cancelled Ballots". Why are "Cancelled Ballots" at a station where workers can generate ballots marked by them to prep them to be scanned. County staff were sitting at the duplication station processing ballots that require duplication. The "cancelled ballot" envelopes described are actually "duplicated ballot" envelopes. The original material of a duplicated ballot must be processed and sealed into a "duplicated ballot" envelope to be stored after this step of the process is completed.
Penny B. 5/31/2026 Why is the date and time when mail in ballot tracker update not posted? Why is the date and name of the responder to the observer questions asked, not posted as is required by Questioner when posted online? The Turnout Tracker Dashboard is operated by the Nevada Secretary of State's office - and has a field at the top indicating when the data was last updated. The NVSOS releases files of this data that are downloadable and timestamped. All observer questions are responded to by the Registrar of Voter's Public Information Officer, George Guthrie. In addition to online posting, question answers are provided via email to the submitter which includes a timestamp.
Valerie W. 5/31/2026 As you are aware, I have observed many, many hours in the Observation Room this election. I’ve noticed a pattern with two workers who have regularly been working in the ballot processing room and especially at the signature verification work stations. A worker with long red hair and light pink eyeglasses (name unknown) pairs herself with the same individual over and over again and has been doing so for many days when they’ve both been working. The other worker is “Cate” or “Cait.” They frequently sit at the signature verification workstation farthest away from the observation container regardless of there being 7 vacant signature verification workstations. Election Department’s authentic desire to provide meaningful observation would accommodate observers by placing signature verifying workers at work stations closest to the observation container. An authentic desire for instilling confidence in the ballot processing room’s operations would also entail monitoring that the same individuals are not repeatedly verifying signatures together. Tracking worker pairs at the signature verification station would also be helpful in giving observers confidence that “agreements” or collaboration between workers have not been made. If observers had the opportunity to verify workers’ actual party affiliation, and if there were enforced penalties for workers’ false representation via badge color re party affiliation, this doubt as to the accuracy of signature verification work by workers wouldn’t exist. Just a few minutes ago, both workers have been looking over their shoulders at me to see if I were watching them. This also creates doubt as to the accuracy of their work at the signature verification work stations today and previously. I’m requesting that pairs of workers not be allowed to repeatedly work together at the signature verification work stations to avoid the appearance of impropriety. I’m requesting that signature verification workers be located at work stations closest to the observation container rather than farthest away from observers in order to provide meaningful observation. Will Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald support meaningful verification and instill confidence in the accuracy of manual signature verification for observers concerned about the signature verification work being done at these work stations? Both are very reasonable requests. The Registrar of Voters Office verifies employee voter registration records before assigning badges color-coded to their party, and there is no misrepresentation of an employee’s party affiliation. Employees working within the Central Counting Place are trained to conduct signature verification in accordance with Nevada law and perform signature verification in compliance with those requirements. While working, employees may look around the room, and doing so does not affect the accuracy or validity of the work being performed. All signature verification stations are available for use by staff, as each station is meaningfully observable from the observation booth.
Roblyn W. 6/1/2026 Again, a person is working at the table in the cage under the camera and out of "meaningful observation". This has been a repeated complaint. There are 4 vacant seats she can be using, on camera. You say have repeatedly spoken to the staff, George Gutherie. Are there ever any consequences when the supervisors and rules are ignored? The batching table within the ballot cage is viewable from the observation booth directly and from the livestream camera, with differing angles. There is no rule that staff may not use this table depending on vacant seats, but processing room staff are always encouraged to make their actions as clear as possible to observers.
Roblyn W. 6/1/2026 We witnessed a worker remove her red "republican" badge in the processing room and hand it to Andrew, who put it on, who has been sitting + chatting with Addie + George, who then gave it to George. We were told that badges would not be used by others or exchanged. Because, after checking the county workers voter registration, they are assigned a badge based on their party to participate in teams where tasks need a team of two different parties. This is important, to be sure cheating cannot occur. George said the badges have names and are kept in the outer offices and reused by those workers. Why, then, did we just see a worker take off her badge and hand it over? At a time that we have been questioning why there are rarely republican county employees working, so they were never part of teams in sensitive areas, it was nice to see four in the room today so imagine my surprise when we saw the badge exchange before she left. was she wearing Georgeʼs badge instead of being issued her own? Are badges issued to workers without vetting, to better represent parties now? The Registrar's office ensures there are available bi-partisan teams to conduct bi-partisan mandated processing within the" Life of a Ballot". Outside of this, we strive to include as much party representation as possible with the staffing resources available. The worker you are describing handed her assigned badge over to supervisors to be securely stored along with their hardware security key used to access the voter registration system, as it was the end of their shift. As a courtesy to observers, badges issued indicate the staffer’s party, and this is verified by checking it against their voter registration.
Roblyn W. 6/2/2026 In a discussion with George Gutherie on 5/31/26, about the continual belief by observers there is a lack of required "meaningful observation" in the ballot processing room, he told us that representatives from Washoe GOP, Nevada GOP, and the Trump team, declared there was "meaningful observation" being provided by the ROV. Who were those people and what day did they tour and view the ballot process in the ballot processing room? Washoe County’s Central Counting Place offers the opportunity to visit in person and meaningfully observe ballot processing operations. The Registrar of Voters Office also provides a courtesy livestream as an additional transparency measure. Between elections during the 2024 election cycle, the Registrar of Voters Office conducted observation tours for representatives of various stakeholder organizations to gather feedback on the layout and configuration of the facility to help maximize meaningful observation within the constraints of the space. Feedback received during these tours was considered, and adjustments were made where appropriate. Both before and after these adjustments, these stakeholders concurred with our assessment that the Central Counting Place provides meaningful observation of ballot processing operations. The overall layout of the Central Counting Place has remained substantially unchanged since the 2024 election cycle. Participating organizations included the NVGOP, NVDEMS, Washoe County Republican Party, and WashoeDems. As these tours were over 2 years ago, we do not have any details on the dates of names of the specific representatives from these organizations.
Roblyn W. 6/2/2026 George Gutherie explained a few days ago how the different machines were closed wifi no outside access. At 4pm 15:45ish on live stream we witness county employee - male, black shirt, beard, glasses, larger, have an issue signing in at the end signature verification (manual) station. He couldnʼt sign in w/ password. He literally went to a GOOGLE PAGE to ask a question about small business programming, now he is on the opening page with the many little images i see on lobby computers when idol. The second witness is a 50 year software and firmware specialist with many years of programming. WE BOTH WITNESSED THE WORD GOOGLE. If nothing in processing room connects to the outside, how did this happen? ARE ANY MACHINES ABLE TO CONNECT TO AN OUTSIDE INTERNET CONNECTION TO BE ABLE TO GET TO A GOGGLE SEARCH BAR? As previously explained, the voter registration system and the election management system are two completely separate and unique systems utilized within the Central Counting Place. The election management system does not have any connection to the internet - while the voter registration system does have connection in order to access the Statewide VREMS system.
Roblyn W. 6/2/2026 On 6/1/2026 I wrote a written complaint about witnessing a badge situation that was not what George told me was procedure, after complaining there were never republican representation. The next day 4 appeared. One was wearing a Rep badge given to George and he put in on leading us to believe she was given Georgeʼs (who had come in the room without his - the first time we have seen that) Badge to wear, to look like the room republicans - suddenly - after 2 weeks of observing, or at least it seemed that to us. Now, today, seems my complaint has caused a change in procedure. Now a bunch of badge colors are being kept inside the processing room, not assigned w/ names identifying a vetted county workers political party. Is this the new procedure to "help" the observers know that the requirements of bipartisan teams are being respected where people decide the intentions of the original voter, and make a new ballot for them, properly reproducing those ballots? What is the new procedure? The Registrar of Voters Office verifies employee voter registration records before assigning badges color-coded to their party, and there is no misrepresentation of an employee’s party affiliation. Badges are not shared between employees, and these badges all have names. The Public Information Officer's badge is uniquely identifiable by the 8 gold stars, indicating he is the assigned staff to answer observation questions. Some badges are stored within the Central Counting Place as they come coupled with their hardware security key used to access the voter registration system.
Roblyn W. 6/2/2026 What is Serena doing on the computer in front of the desk? This is an area there is no meaningful observation. The screen shows voter information on screens at the signature verification center where manual verication is necessary, and, because information on voters can be changed by county workers, always needs a bipartisan team. My understanding is that the only task a solo worker is allowd to do is to enter undeliverable mail into the voters record. This was not the case. She was not looking at envelopes, just the page onlne, going to drop downs, and changing data on voters pages, then going to the next. Can you provide meaningful observation to this area. There are two questions here. Serena is a permanent ROV employee assigned to work in the Central Counting Place. Serena works at this workstation to ensure permanent staff is always available to supervise and assist Central Counting Place operations. During times when she is not conducting mail ballot processing operations, she is completing other assigned duties such as voter registration processing.
Briana F. 6/2/26 Thank you for your reply. I do want to state, once again, that on May 23, 2026 around 9am, a security guard noticed that, in the central counting place, on the mail in ballot processing floor, the back door to the garage, where ballot deliveries are made, was left ajar. I observed the security guard open and close the door. I then asked Rohit, around 9:13am, in the office, if it had been left ajar. Rohit went back to the processing floor and asked the guard and then verified with me that it had in fact been left ajar and unsecured and that the security guard closed it. You can access your county security camera footage to verify this. I understand that accidents happen and that is why I asked that members of the public have access to a livestream view of that back door. We have been able to view these doors on livestream feeds of election footage in the past. You stated in your published answer on the county web page that the door I mentioned was not within the central counting place and that is not accurate. Could you please revisit that question and reflect on this statement? There was in fact an unsecured door on the mail in ballot processing floor. I have attached a photo of the back door, left ajar.
I also wrote in that same group of published questions: “5. The staff member who performed daily maintenance this morning wears a small black rectangular device on his hip. What is this?” And you replied. “The device mentioned on an employee's hip is a phone.” I have attached a photo, it is not a phone, but a smaller device. Could you also please revisit that question? I have attached a photo of the device.
I tried to bring the important observation about the back door to Mr. McDonald’s attention immediately on May 23, 2026 in a handwritten letter, however the answers were just addressed to me today, June 2, 2026, after I was required to submit them on an observation form.
Thank you for the clarification of which door you were speaking of, as there are multiple doors to the garage in Building A. The event you’re referring to was on the morning of Saturday, May 23rd. As mail ballots were delivered from the USPS, a door to the garage was not fully shut behind an employee as the final delivery was made. This occurred at 8:08am, and the door was left partially closed until it was fully closed at 9:07am. Staff were present in the room for the entire duration of the hour it was improperly closed, and a security guard post is set right next to this very door. As soon as staff were notified of the door not being properly closed, the team reviewed and confirmed no entry or exit of staff or any materials occurred. As for the matter of the rectangular device, the specific staff member you were referencing to is known to wear their phone on their hip. After inspecting the photo you provided, the “device” you are referring to is a lanyard connected to the employee’s phone within his pocket. Observers with questions are required to submit the prescribed question form. Intentional circumvention of this process via handwritten letters or other submission methods are not accepted.
Glenn O. 6/3/2026 On 06/02/2026 at 1910 pdt, a team entered the ballot processing room from the west end and delivered ballots in blue bags that were inside green bags. Per NRS 293.462 The container must be metal or rigid container. Each container must have a separately- numbered seal. As it against the law to not use rigid or metal containers for this purpose. As it against the law to not provide a way to make the numbered seals observable? The Registrar's Office allows the observation of the delivery of our sealed containers used for transporting ballots to the Central Counting Place. These containers are constructed from a multi-layer composite material consisting of vinyl-coated nylon and polyester fabric bonded with a moisture-resistant inner liner. The material is exceptionally strong and wear-resistant, maintaining its structural integrity during transport and handling while providing secure protection for ballots. Numbered seals are tracked in chain-of-custody documentation to ensure the containers have not been opened during transit from the collection location to the Central Counting Place. It is worth noting that the Registrar's Office is currently evaluating new ballot transport container options, and the containers used in future elections may change as alternatives are assessed for operational efficiency and security.
Barbara F. 6/4/2026 1) Are the "manual signature verifications" work stations used for other reasons besides sig verifs? I have seen 1 person at each station during observations, several times. 2) Where in the NRS specifically is the ballot process you are following? 3) Are the ballots being run thru the sorter fr this morningsʼ USPS delivery + last nightʼs polling places deliveries after closing? Manual signature verification workstations can be and are used for other purposes like checking in undeliverable mail ballots, which only requires 1 person. NAC 293.322 is a fantastic example of ballot processing law within Title 24. Ballots being run through the sorter in the morning are those that are received from the USPS, while the night's polling place deliveries are run that same night.
Valerie W. 6/6/2026 1) Describe the flow of the voter registration file in our system. 2) What is the connection between the overseer station and the EMS? Are they physically connected or with wifi? 3) What is the role of the overseer with the voter registration file? 4) Why does the overseer need to update the voter registration file? 5) Why does the EMS have to maintain the latest version of the registration file? 6) Why does the EMS workstation system need to have the updated version of the registration file? 7) Where do the “new numbers” of registrations come from? 8) What do you mean by “numbers”? 9) Why does the overseer need to update the voter registration file? 10) Why does the EMS have to maintain the latest version of the registration file? 11) Why does the EMS workstation system need to have the updated version of the registration file 12) Where do the “new numbers” of registrations come from? 13) What do you mean by “numbers”? At the conclusion of Early Voting, the voter registration count is updated within the Election Management System (EMS) in preparation for Election Day. This update ensures that the EMS accurately reflects the number of registered voters in each precinct and district throughout Washoe County. The count of registered voters is sourced directly from the Statewide Voter Registration System (VREMS), which is accessible from the “overseer station”. Because the EMS is an offline system that is not connected to any network, wireless technology, or Bluetooth, and does not contain functionality to modify the registration count file internally, the file must be exported from the EMS and transferred via an external USB storage device to the “overseer station” for editing. The overseer station is not connected to the EMS and cannot directly access EMS data. Once the update is completed, the file is transferred back to and imported into the EMS using the same external USB storage device.
Valerie W. 6/6/2026 How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots have been received as of 6.5.26? How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots have been duplicated as of 6.5.26? How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots have been scanned as of 6.5.26? Please provide the number of EASE/UOCAVA ballots received on: May 23, May 24, May 25, May 26, May 27, May 28, May 29, May 30, May 31, June 1, June 2, June 3, June 4, June 5? How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots are waiting to be duplicated? How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots are waiting to be scanned? All mail ballot data is available daily within on the Registrar of Voter's website, under the 2026 Election Data page. Once an EASE ballot is verified and accepted, the ballot must be duplicated to be processed, and then the duplicated ballot is scanned.
Oscar W. 6/7/2026 1) How many people have been assigned a "hardware security key" used to access the voter registration system? 2) What other systems do these people have admin access to? 3) Do they have full admin authorization when in the system? We are unable to provide information related to the security of an election information system as such information is confidential pursuant to NRS 293.870. I can say these hardware security keys are nothing more than a 2 factor authentication method used to log in to the system, and does not grant administrative access.
Roblyn W. 6/7/2026 Serena was again doing a task at the end of the off camera area of the table, handling ballot envelopes of some sort. Was this a task that can be done by one person, or is there need for two? We do not have meaningful observation into the batching area when off camera so we do not know. In the Life of a Ballot, only Manual Signature Verification, Counting Board, Duplication, and Digital Adjudication require a bi-partisan team of two. Serena was not conducting a task that requires two people.
Patrick M. 6/7/2026 I know there are supposed to be 2 people who verify signatures at the signature verification computers. Sometimes though, I`ve seen just 1 worker using those computers alone. If other things than signature verification can be done at those computers, what are all those other things? When is it allowed for one person to do any kind of work at any of those verification stations? Is it the same program used as when someone is doing signature? Why do the people doing work at the signature verification stations sometimes have ballots they`re looking at in their hands and sometimes not? I`ve seen Addie and one other person sometimes sit at the closest signature verification computer sign in on the clipboard, then sign out almost immediately and walk away. What is she doing? Manual signature verification workstations can be and are used for other purposes like checking in undeliverable mail ballots, which only requires 1 person. Recently, these workstations have been also used to finish checking in ballots that had initial issues running through first and second sort. Addie and another are most likely conducting our audit of the ballots Automatically Signature Verified, where a sample of 2% of automatically accepted signatures are manually checked.
Allison H. 6/7/2026 This is my first time observing in person. I ʼve viewed from the YouTube prior. Iʼm very surprised by how much larger the room is in person. Why isnʼt there a camera showing the duplication station, or even anything that shows monitor screens? Iʼm also surprised the live TV feed isnʼt actually live, rather 30 seconds (about) behind. How is this not a live feed? The city is investing in cameras to monitor the public... why not better cams for transparency? Washoe County's Central Counting Place accommodates ballot processing operations, staff workstations, observers, and a courtesy livestream all within a limited space that has been operationally outgrown. Workstation layouts and camera placement are intentionally designed to maximize meaningful observation while balancing operational efficiency. Throughout the 2024 election cycle, our office devoted significant effort to evaluating observability, reviewing camera angles and locations, adjusting workstation placements where feasible, and gathering feedback from stakeholders. The current layout reflects the outcome of that review process. The TV by the observation booth is displaying the available YouTube livestream. It is not set up as a live CCTV feed, which is why there is a delay.
Roblyn W. 6/8/2026 A person in the room working on an extractor has no identification on. He is wearing an olive green ball cap + shirt and is wearing glasses. He + his pal laughed when they saw me taking their picture. Who is he and who does he work for? He is touching election equipment. This was a technician from OPEX conducting maintenance on our OPEX ballot extraction machines. Vendors are not required to wear party badges.
Roblyn W. 6/8/2026 At 13:02 on livestream video, a woman in a green shirt, white sweater, glasses, and her hair in a clip, pushed a red cart into the processing room. It appeared empty except for her purse she put on it. She laid it down as Addie rushed over, and put her back to her, partially hiding my view, from the observation booth on the other side of the room, and not visible on any camera. I then saw her quickly remove 2 devices that appeared the size of walkie talkies and slide them next to the wall of the red cart. Mostly out of view but my camera did capture the corner of one. The lady rolled up the bag they were brought here in. Addie quickly grabbed them and walked out the office door with them, after they sat in the room a few minutes. Within a minute Addie walked in without them. What were those devices, in detail, why was a cart taken into the ballot processing room? Were the devices capable of gathering data via WiFi or emit data via WiFi? This staff member was delivering a cart for use in the ballot intake process on Election Night. These devices are standard basic two-way walkie-talkie radios.
Briana F. 6/8/2026 On June 8, just before and after 3 p.m., Justin and another gentleman with a cell phone were in & out of the EMS tabulation room and were working on a computer station. What task were they completing? I saw a screen layered on work station that read: "Election Summary Report Closed Primary" and also words representatives for Congressional DEM" (layered behind the screens any were working on) Could you please captian these tasks and what was on the screen? ROV Staff were preparing the Results Dashboard for Election Day. This includes final testing and uploading a zero file for the dashboard to display until the release of results after all polls have closed across the state.
James W. 6/8/2026 1) When observing the computer monitor display for manual signature verification, I noticed that some envelope signatures & the signature on file images matched exactly, no doubt the two signatures were identical, then (why does this ballot envelope end up in the signature validation process?) 2) Also, some signatures are not even close, the signature on the envelope & the signature on file are not from the same person, but the signature verification team puts that envelope in the same box? Tray as the signatures that matches exactly? (Why did they put the envelopes into the same box?) While being sorted through our ballot sorter, some mail ballots fail to be sorted and must be sorted manually by hand. These individuals you observed are likely conducting manual review, which could entail a mix of ballots that were accepted or rejected. If a ballot is accepted, the system accepts the ballot envelope signature as a new signature on the voter’s file. If staff is then re-checking this already accepted ballot, this would cause the screen to display record’s most recent signature (the ballot envelope) and then the signature on the ballot envelope. A signature may not appear to match a voter’s record, however the voter may have cured this signature by providing further identification information, prompting staff to accept the ballot like the others.
Briana F. 6/8/2026 When the lights are off in the EMS / tabulation room (the lights in the back of the room) there is a terrible glare on the observation window which makes it difficult to view what you are working on in the room. Could you please turn on the lights? The lights have been turned on.
Briana F. 6/8/2026 On June 8, between approx. 2 p.m.-2:30 p.m., Justin was working at the table in the cage with his laptop and went through 5-6 open grey trays of ballot-like papers that were stored in the cage. What was he working on and where is that information stored electronically? Justin conducts regular audits of the batches scanned into the Election Management System. The information is not stored electronically as they are manual recordings done by staff at scanning stations.
Briana F. 6/9/2026 At or about 3:45 p.m., in the tabulation room, the laptop at the admin station was swapped out with a laptop that was carried in from the processing floor. Why? Then that laptop was carried from the admin station to the tabulation computers. Could you clarify as to why they are using the laptop to transfer tabulated data instead of the fixed admin computer as in years past? Earlier in the afternoon an SD card reader was swapped out. Why? Were the card readers and equipment in the tabulation room tested with pre-LAT? Are the card readers classified as (or defined) a mechanical recording device or automatic tabulation equipment? Thank you The reformatting station laptop was replaced with a newer laptop. The old laptop remains inactive, sitting on the same table in the room for transparency. SD card readers and reformatting station laptops do not play a part in logic and accuracy testing.
Roblyn W. 6/9/2026 At approximately 5:20 p.m. on Election Day four people witnessed a woman working ballot processing, sitting at a signature verification computer and opened a page that was titled "Washoe County Job Opportunities" while ballots all around were being processed. She is wearing a green sleeveless blouse with a red tag. The other woman is not wearing a badge. Is this normal procedure during a count, and are badges required at all times? It is likely the staff member was browsing while waiting for more work to do at the signature verification station. Supervisors discussed with the individual later on about not doing this. Party badges worn by staff are a courtesy provided by our office to observers and the supervisors running the Central Counting Place do their best to ensure staff always wear them when able.
Penny B. 6/9/2026 Why were observers on 6/7/26 around 1:15 accused of having cell phones on by George Guthrie and also the security guard? What evidence was given to make that allegation? An observer was seen using a mobile telephone by the security guard and reported the concern to ROV staff. Observers are prohibited from using mobile telephones within the Central Counting Place pursuant to NAC 293.356, the observer was given a written warning. Before observing, observers are required to sign an acknowledgement form which clearly states mobile telephones are not allowed to be used during observation.
Penny B. 6/9/2026 Since some of the observation questions cannot be answered per the ROV, can you please list all the things the ROV can't tell us? If not, why not? Thank you. Examples of confidential records under Nevada election law include election system security information such as access controls, authentication methods, and other records that could compromise system integrity if disclosed. Protected voter information and certain identifying information are also confidential.
Penny B. 6/9/2026 Why did the ROV not accept the funds from the NV GOP for needed cameras in the Ballot Processing Room? Thank you. The Registrar of Voters does not have the authority to accept donations or allocate said funds.
Penny B. 6/9/2026 Why is there not a camera on the sorter equipment where the mail ballot envelopes are fed into the sorter and also to see the two screens? What collation is the sorter at and how many mail ballots will be processed an hour? Thank you. The current camera configuration was designed to maximize meaningful observation of the overall mail ballot processing workflow within the physical and technical constraints of the Central Counting Place. Because only four livestream cameras are available, coverage is prioritized toward broader operational areas rather than individual pieces of equipment or workstation screens, and the sorter is located within an area already visible to in-person observers. The sorter’s collation settings and the number of mail ballots processed per hour can vary depending on operational flow.
James W. 6/9/2026 (Tue 6/9/26 5:45 p.m. / scanning station) The scanner prints a mark on the back left edge of the ballot when it goes through the scanner; one worker on workstation 1 checks the back left edge for the markings visually, inspecting that each ballot has been marked by the scanner. The worker on workstation 2 does not visually inspect the back left edge for the markings, she just puts all the ballots back into the folder and puts them in the box (why does she not visually inspect that each scanned ballot has been properly marked by the scanner?) Staff does not need to visually inspect the scanner imprint on every ballot during normal processing. The imprint is typically checked only when there is an initial scanning issue or exception that requires staff to verify whether a ballot successfully passed through and was recorded by the scanner.
Penny B. 6/9/2026 Why can't observers have their cell phones on in the observation room when many observe for long hours? Observers are prohibited from using mobile telephones within the Central Counting Place pursuant to NAC 293.356.
Penny B. 6/9/2026 How is it determined if a mail ballot is "undeliverable", "returned", "canceled", or "rejected", or "accepted"? Thank you. A mail ballot is marked “undeliverable” if it is returned by the United States Postal Service as undeliverable to the voter. A mail ballot would be marked “returned” if the ballot has been received but not yet processed. It is “accepted” if it passes signature verification and is eligible to be counted, “canceled” if voided, and “rejected” if it fails to pass signature verification.
Briana F. 6/9/2026 On June 9, Election Day, at approximately 4:30 (or 5:30?) staff members entered EMS/tabulation room with some new external hardware and set them next to the tabulation room equipment. (after early vote scans) 1) What were these devices? 2) Why were they installed? 3) When were they tested? 4) Does this hardware need to be certified by the pre-LAT board? 5) Where did they come from? Thank you. ROV Staff brought in additional SD card readers for use on Election Night. As the desktops do not have an internal SD card reader, we required more external SD card readers to process the in-person votes that are returned on Election Night. SD card readers do not play a part in logic and accuracy testing.
Briana F. 6/9/2026 On June 9, Election Day, around 19:14 on livestream, Brad and Daniel entered EMS/Tabulation room and left with a clear zipped pouch with what looked like an SD card inside. Can you explain what they were doing? Thank you. Brad and Daniel were collecting an Election Day vote center SD card bag that was mistakenly brought back during the end of Early Voting by a poll worker. The bag was brought back to the vote center for use later that night. The bag did not have any SD cards inside when it was delivered to the Central Counting Place and did not have any SD cards inside when it was removed.
James W. 6/10/2026 Wed 6/11/26 @11:15 a.m., There is a young man in a blue shirt, with a beard, who has been in the ballot room all morning. He has a shoulder sling with a bag on it. What is in the black bag (what are the contents of the black bag, part of the shoulder sling)? (who is this gentlemen & what is his role in the ballot room with the sorting equipment?) Are the tools in that shoulder sling black bag? He is running some sort of app on his mobile phone, does this app on the phone communicate with the ballot equipment? (Does it communicate with the sorting machine) This individual is our Bluecrest ballot sorter technician on-site to assist with any mechanical issues that may arise during the Election, such as part replacement. There is no app, Wi-Fi, or external wireless connection that communicates with the ballot sorter.
James W. 6/10/2026 1) During manual signature validation the screen shows the scanned signature from the envelope and the signature on file side-by-side, there is another screen that shows 2 pie charts. What are the pie charts for, what purpose? (why are these 2 charts displayed sometimes?) This is in the "TotalVote" application I believe. 2) The people doing the signature verification are not trained handwriting experts, so they are more apt to make mistakes than an expert. (What is their error rate at matching handwriting?) TotalVote, otherwise known as the Statewide Voter Registration System (VREMS), is used by staff to access a voter’s record, and furthermore, their unique ballot information. TotalVote has pie charts on the home page to visualize registration numbers. Election signature verification is conducted in accordance with the standards and procedures taught through the Nevada Secretary of State's signature verification training mandated by NRS 293.877. All staff performing signature verification are required to take this training and pass a test to prove proficiency.
Janet B. 6/10/2026 On election night were all of the mail-in and dropped off ballots opened and scanned and tabulated election night? All the ballots we saw being handled today (Wed 6/10/2026) delivered from the post office? The mail ballots processed on 6/10/2026 were a combination of ballots received throughout Election Day (6/9/2026) and those received from the post office the morning of 6/10/2026. More than 20% of all voted mail ballots were received on 6/9/2026, and due to that significant volume, they could not all be processed same day.
James W. 6/11/2026 In the Tabulation room, the USB card readers for the computer have multiple different slots that will accommodate different sized media (Why do the USB card readers, for reading the SD cards, allow other physically different sized media to be inserted into the same card reader?) The USB card readers used in the Tabulation room are commercially available multi-format card readers designed to support various types and sizes of removable media. It is standard for these devices to include multiple slots to accommodate different physical card formats.
Pam S. 6/11/2026 At 8:28 a.m. I watched delivery of grey post office bins through garage door. One of the bins had a small # of ballots sticking up vertically not horizontal. Serena took out half of the ballots in a bin with a stamp. She went to counting table + started stamping too quickly to look at each ballot’s postmark. What was Serena stamping on these ballots? At 8:48 a.m. a worker at tables in front of sorter with post office bins called for Gabby. Gabby took a few office ballots to Abby. Gabby comes back + I could hear her say ballots need to go in different bins. Gabby makes labels with red sharpie "posted date after Rd" + "posted date posted" when the workers finished they took all bins to the cage + placed them by side on bottom shelf across from cage entrance. The 4 bins appear to be almost full. What do these labels written by Gabby with red sharpie mean? What will happen with these ballots next? Staff may manually date-stamp mail ballot envelopes instead of using the ballot sorter, which commonly occurs with undeliverable mail ballots and ballots received with postmarks after Election Day. The bins you are describing are labeled “Postmarked After ED (Election Day).” Staff must separate ballots postmarked on or before Election Day from those postmarked after Election Day, as ballots postmarked after Election Day cannot be counted. Those ballots remain unopened, logged, and securely stored.
Pam S. 6/11/2026 At 7:58 this morning I was walking down the hallway towards the ROV office to sign in for observing. A man walked by carrying at least one neon green + one orange bag I have seen used by runners delivering ballots from polling locations. What exactly was in the bags? Was he delivering ballots this morning? Was he by himself? And where were they from if it was a ballot delivery? Ballot runners and supply runners, including scheduled backup runners, are issued equipment such as ballot transport containers. The day after the election, runners return their equipment along with their timecards so the Registrar’s Office can log hours worked and mileage for compensation. The runners you saw were not delivering ballots.
Roblyn W. 6/11/2026 It appears that the dropbox at the Cares homeless campus was open on Election Day. We were of the understanding only drop boxes at certified polling places were being used. Why was this drop box allowed to stay open and how many and who stayed and observed it? How many exact ballots were collected on Election Day there and, which runners brought them in to the intake in the county garage? The mail ballot drop box at the Nevada Cares Campus was an official voting location during both Early Voting and Election Day for the 2026 Primary Election. A total of 67 mail ballots were deposited at this drop box on Election Day. After polls closed, the mail ballots were transported to the Central Counting Place by the poll workers assigned to that location. Observation was open to the public for the entire duration of the vote location being open, and while it was being closed. Observation logs are still being processed so I do not currently have information on these specific drop box observers.
Roblyn W. 6/11/2026 At 10:25, there was a man with a blue shirt with green + white stripes at the extraction machine. He had his badges on his back. Inside the pocket of his badge was a thumbdrive. Please tell me exactly why a staff worker would have a thumbdrive and what is that drive's exact use inside the ballot processing room? This is not a thumb drive, but rather a hardware security key used to log in to the various workstations in the Central Counting Place that access the voter registration system.
Roblyn W. 6/11/2026 I notice the ballot scanners get marked on the back long edge when scanned. There has been a lot of maintenance on the scanners. While cleaning or doing maintenance can the part making the mark be shut off? Please answer to this exact question and cite your expert source, since you are the P.R. guy and have told us many times that type of knowledge is not your expertise. Thank you. No. While cleaning or doing maintenance the part making the mark cannot be shut off. The mark is necessary for the Risk Limiting Audit (RLA).
Roblyn W. 6/11/2026 On election night, unknown to any onsite observers ballot intake was set up in the garage. The staff appeared in processing room, then started leaving like a shift change. George spoke to the press outside our observation room and said something to them then looked like they decided to take a break, with two staying behind on their personal phones + open, active computers, while all processing equipment was active. One, a curly haired man was identified to me from A.P. They were on their personal phones and computers the whole time. We have been told only county phones + computers were allowed in the processing room. What exact safety precautions are taken when allowing the press to use their electronic equipment + personal ability to connect to WiFi and to prevent trojan viruses from being released while actively counting. I am looking for NRS codes or exact processing room written rules + codes. Staff are allowed to have their phones on their persons, though we recommend them to leave their personal phones elsewhere before entering the Central Counting Place. Personal phones are not allowed to be used, while County assigned phones are allowed to be used. Credentialed press are allowed to use equipment necessary to conduct their assignment. Only observers are prohibited from using mobile telephones within the Central Counting Place pursuant to NAC 293.356. The Election Management System (EMS) operates in a closed environment separate from public internet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and other external wireless connections. As a result, electronic devices used in the vicinity would have no impact on the system.
Roblyn W. 6/11/2026 On election night there were many observers in the observation booth. We saw a lot of staff arrive and a lot leave, thinking shift change. We saw George Guthrie say something to the press + saw them leave out the garage doors thinking their trucks were there and they took a break. As things got louder we wanted to see what was happening, while we waited in the booth, wondering why they weren't setting up intake tables. Imagine our surprise to find a huge intake space set up far across the garage. Q1 - Why was I, and observer there since just after 12 noon, not notified intake was taking place in the garage when the press was notified? Personally? Q2 - Why was the press put close up where meaningful observation was possible? Not observers? Q3 - Why did you refuse to allow us to move closer to observe, giving us the area just out the garage doors and about 3 feet into the side walk, and then post 2 guards on either side of the observers? Q4 - Why was a chair refused an elderly lady, there to observe? Q5 - Was stuff moved by inner hall in an attempt to hide the intake area from me as long as possible? Election Night ballot intake was conducted in the garage connected to the Central Counting Place, where a designated observation area was established for observers. This observation area provides meaningful observation of the ballot intake process and was comparable in size to the observation space available in the observation booth. The designated observation area in the garage was opened to observers before ballot intake had begun, but only once it was safe to do so, as a large volume of staff and equipment was moving throughout the garage to set up the intake process. Once the area was fully set up and safe for access, observers were notified that the garage observation area for ballot intake was available. Security guards were present because, unlike the enclosed observation booth, the garage observation area was located within an open operational environment and required controlled access to maintain safety and security during ballot intake. Observers requested to move the swivel high-top chairs from the observation booth into the garage observation area, but that request was denied due to the elevated space constraints and safety concerns. A safer option for a chair was instead provided for accessibility purposes. No equipment or materials were moved for the purpose of obstructing observation.
Roblyn W. 6/11/2026 At 12:28, Gabby is at the end of the table at the counting board. She is working on her county computer she is allowed to take home. She has a tray of ballot envelopes next to her and she is inputting data, while continually glancing over at me, catching my attention. In detail, what envelopes are those? Are they cast ballot envelopes or envelopes that were undeliverable by the post office? There is no meaningful observation. What data is she taking from the envelopes into her personal county computer, that goes home with her at night? ROV Staff members are assigned County work laptops to conduct their election board or voter registration duties. These laptops are not for personal use and only a select few staff ever do bring them home. Gabi accesses the TotalVote (VREMS) system via her laptop to conduct tasks related to voter registration or mail ballot envelope processing. If she was going through the tray of ballots, it is likely she was manually sorting, manually checking in, or processing signature cures.
Roblyn W. 6/11/2026 Around 11:30, Daniel, the IT guy, was sitting at the EASE + UOCAVA computers, out of meaningful observation. This is where digital ballots are sent via WiFi, from Carson City SOS. Daniel was there a long time - 11:30ish - 12:08ish. The computer screen was off but he was working on his personal county computer, that he takes home at night. He seemed to be entering data, maybe on an Excel sheet. I may have seen a glimpse of a ballot. I know this is an area where people take that data and make a ballot, using the votes they believe was of the intention of the overseas or military voter. This is a two person bipartisan job. Daniel finished, closed his computer, printed something and went to the overseer desk, + worked on that computer. At 12:16 Daniel + Gabby went back to the hard to view EASE computer, opened the other screen. It looked like a Microsoft program was up - green header space w/ blue horizontal cell line. I suspect they are duplicating but no meaningful observation. Daniel glanced at me on my binoculars and they put what looked like a ballot in a gray tray + took the tray in the cage & shut down processing. Please explain in detail what was being done out of view? As explained previously, the workstation in the duplication area can be used for general purposes, though it is most often used for EASE/UOCAVA-related tasks. Daniel was using this open workstation for general purposes to conduct an audit of one of the trays of ballots scanned into the Election Management System. The staff you mentioned were not performing duplication.
Roblyn W. 6/11/2026 Please replace the battery in the wall clock by the garage doors. - In addition, the bottom right camera angle is becoming 1/3 ceiling view and we are losing meaningful observation for workers at the end of tables at the Counting Board and signature verification, taking away meaningful observation. Can you please fix that old camera we depend on to see and observe? Why weren't new cameras with better views purchased? Our office continues to accommodate observers by adjusting the camera angle when it appears to shift. The camera is still suitable for our use in enhancing the meaningful observation already available in-person while also providing a livestream for those viewing from home.
Roblyn W. 6/11/2026 Gabby just walked back into the processing room, pointed to her laptop/computer by desk to tell me she was plugging her company laptop into the processing room laptop. I got my binoculars, Addie said something and Gabby moved her company laptop, that goes home with her every night, and then plugged it into the Ease/UOCAVA Duplicating Computer. Is it safe (and legal) to take personal company laptops, that go in and out of the processing room, and home with them, and connect them through a cord between their laptop and the official ballot processing computers? Why isn't the Registrar providing meaningful observation at this very sensitive area? As explained previously, the workstation in the duplication area can be used for general use but is most often used for EASE/UOCAVA purposes. The workstation is completely separate from the Duplication Computer System. ROV Staff members are assigned County work laptops to conduct their election board or voter registration duties. These laptops are not for personal use and only a select few staff ever do bring them home. Meaningful observation of Central Counting Place ballot processing operations remains available from the observation booth.
Penny B. 6/11/2026 What does the post mark on mail ballots look like when returned to the ROV? A post mark can vary but it often looks like a strip of black ink with date information or a round stamp.
Penny B. 6/11/2026 How long does it take to process a mail ballot? There is no definitive amount of time it takes to process a mail ballot. In theory, a single mail ballot could be processed in a relatively short period of time. In practice, however, mail ballot processing occurs in large batches, as ballots move collectively through multiple processing steps, which significantly increases the overall time required.
Valerie W. 6/13/2026 Have any settings been changed on the Automatic Signature Verification since May 2026? Have any updates or changes been made to the Bluecrest device since May 2026? When was the certification testing completed with witnesses present on the Bluecrest device for the 2026 Primary Election? The ROV has set the sorter to automatically signature verify any signatures that meet or are above a 72 confidence score. This confidence score has not changed at any point this election. There is no certification testing required for the mail ballot sorter.
Janet B. 6/13/2026 On 6/9/26 it was noticed that a woman who appeared to be a balllot runner enter the back cage area, take off her vest, and go to a cardboard box and remove what appeared to be a ballot. She handled it more than one and may have placed it with other envelopes. I attempted to review the video but could not locate the video for the date and time frame. Are the videos stored so they can be reviewed on YouTube? YouTube only allows playback of our livestream up to 12 hours. Archived video from the Central Counting Place livestream can be public records requested.
Janet B. 6/13/2026 On Thursday 06/04/2026 during observation, the scanning stations had personal computers that the entry personnel were using. On 6/10/2026 they were not being used. What were their purpose when being used? Why were they not needed on 06/10/2026? County-issued laptops were used for manual batch input tracking to support auditing and reconciliation. These laptops are separate from and not connected to the Election Management System (EMS). This tracking process has since been transitioned to paper-based documentation.
Janet B. 6/13/2026 How can videos be received from any given day? Are the YouTube videos retained? If not - WHY NOT? YouTube only allows playback of our livestream up to 12 hours. Archived video from the Central Counting Place livestream can be public records requested.
Janet B. 6/13/2026 How many rejected ballots due to signature issues were there? Is there a number by day? How many signature verifications were remedied? What is the count by day of those that were resolved? Did the ROV track those reasons? How many did not receive their ballot but their signature not match? How many were not reachable via phone? (disconnected or no longer in service or any other reason?) How many were no longer residents of Nevada or deceased? What was their tracking precinct? The statistics for mail ballots signature acceptance/rejection rates are available on the Nevada Secretary of State's dashboard https://www.nvsos.gov/vivid/. The data for all ballots by day is available on the Registrar of Voter's website https://www.washoecounty.gov/voters/results/2026data.php. The Registrar's office attempts to contact all signature challenged voters by letter and by phone. I do not have available statistics for how many were "not reachable". Any voter who states their mail ballot was voted by someone else is to file an Election Integrity Violation Report with the NVSOS to prompt an investigation.
Roblyn W. 6/14/2026 While observing I noticed that information appears to be moving between processing room and tabulation room via Justin and a scandrive? The next time Justin took a device I thought was a phone, black & similar size, and set it down behind the keyboard and next to the larger box that may be a drive, with cords plugged in. Justin re-arranged it 2 more times until he had it in "the perfect place". Q1 - Are the hard wired scanners the only way you are sending votes into the tally system? Q2 - Is data traveling from a scandisk on 6/14/26? Q3 - What was the device I saw placed @ the workstation in the tabulation room middle computer? Scanners are the only way votes are sent into the Election Management System. Staff utilizes a secure thumbdrive to export reports out of the Election Management System, as it is an offline system incapable of transmitting reports otherwise. The device you saw is the staff member's County-issued phone.
Janet B 6/16/2026 On Sunday, June 14, 2026 the gentleman in the picture appears to be handling ballots. No one else is present. Is this protocol not to have a secondary person available? Justin conducts checks of the Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) paperwork perquisite necessary. The Central Counting Place protocol is to never leave ballots unattended, and atleast 2 individuals, one of which must be permanent ROV staff, be in the room at all times during processing. Teams of 2 for ballot processing is only necessary in specific bi-partisan processes.
Roblyn W. 6/16/2026 We observed laptop that appeared to be connected to one of the signature verification computers. We don't remember seeing this before. Since this station can pause or remove voters from being active, this seems a possible threat of virus, but also, since now we know these computers are hooked up to the internet, and can access Google, is this not a security risk to our voting process? One of the desktop computers used at a signature verification workstation was replaced due to age, and a secure County-issued laptop is now being used in its place. Access to the voter registration system (otherwise known as VREMS or TotalVote), requires the use of multi factor authentication (MFA). County-issued devices are managed under County IT security requirements and utilize the County’s standard cybersecurity protections.
Roblyn W. 6/16/2026 Today at 1:00, Addie had her laptop plugged into the senior staff computer that GABBY had initially plugged into the other day. Why are laptops that could be compromised when taken home, meeded to be plugged into what should be a secure data environment? Are virus scans madatory before plugging in? General workstations consist of a monitor and power supply/docking connection for County-issued staff work laptops. Staff laptops are not being plugged into another computer at this station. The same applies to the UOCAVA/EASE workstation: there is no computer-to-computer connection. County-issued devices are managed under County IT security requirements and utilize the County’s standard cybersecurity protections.
Valerie W. 6/16/2026 Scanners on the left wall of the Observation Room are being used this afternoon. Scanner #1 is beside the hallway wall and Scanner #2 is at the front left corner of the Observation Room. (1) Describe the type of mail-in ballots that are being scanned on these Scanners #1 and #2. (2) Have Scanners #1 and #2 been used at any time during this election? (3) On which dates and times have Scanners #1 and #2 been used to scan mail-in ballots this election? (4) Why are Scanners #1 and #2 being used at this time when they haven't been used on any prior dates this election? (5) Are different scanners used for different types of mail-in ballots? These scanners are designated and used only for provisional ballots. Verified provisional ballots were not scanned and cast until June 16th, following the deadline for provisional voters provide the required documentation. Scanners 1-9 are for mail ballots, scanners 10-11 are for provisionals.
Valerie W. 6/16/2026 (1) Has the signature verification setting on the Bluecrest device remained constant throughout Early Voting and Election Day processing? (2) If the Bluecrest settings for Automatic Signature Verification have been changed during this election, when were they changed? Why were they changed? (3) Please detail all changes made to any Bluecrest settings and/or software during the election? (4) Have any changes been made to the Bluecrest settings or software after certification of the device? (5) Please provide details on the Bluecrest device's malfunctions during this election. The Bluecrest vendor was seen working on the device multiple times this election. His activities differed from the daily maintenance observers have seen on many days. The ROV has set the sorter to automatically signature verify any signatures that meet or are above a 72 confidence score. This confidence score has not changed at any point this election. There is no certification testing required for the mail ballot sorter. There have been no software or settings changed. The Bluecrest technician was assisting with physical maintenance of the machine such as feeders, belts, gears, wheels, etc.
James W. 6/17/2026 1. Is there a UPS battery backup unit connected to the servers in the EMS room to supply power to in the event of a power outage to the building, or a wide spread power outage to this area of town? 2. Is there a UPS connected to the Blue Crest computers to supply power in the event of a power outage? 3. Is there a backup generator to supply power to the computers in EMS room in the event of a power outage to the building? 4. If there is a backup generator for the building was it tested before the the June 2026 primary election? Thank you. Yes to all of the above.
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