Observation Questions

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2026 Primary Election Questions and Answers

For the 2026 Primary Election, detailed or at-length observation questions are required to be submitted using the official question form. Responses will be provided as resources and operational timelines allow, usually within 72 hours. Acceptance and processing of submitted questions are subject to review by the Registrar of Voters’ Office.

Questions and answers submitted during the 2026 Primary Election.
Submitter & Date	Question	Answer
Valerie W. 5/15/2026	Describe in detail the chain of custody process that will be used to transport the ballots printed at the ICX stations then delivered to the ROV processing room? Which vote center staff will remove the ballots and complete the chain of custody documents? What is the schedule for removing the ICP tank's ballots be transferred to boxes? What documentation will be completed when the ICP ballots are removed from the tank, and who will be signing the documentation? How will the ICP ballots be secured before leaving the vote center? Who will transport the ICP ballots to the ROV processing room? Where will the ICP ballots be stored securely? Would you please describe which type of ballots will go where on the cage shelving? It's important to know which area will hold the various types of ballots meaning already scanned, waiting to be scanned, ballots needing duplication, undeliverables, etc. The shelving areas are obviously not visible from the fishtank. The labeling on the front of the shelving is not visible from the wall cameras. The cage is essentially unobservable. It is not meaningful to simply see a body in the cage but have no observation regarding which ballots are being accessed. Why are the already scanned ballots not sealed after the batches have been scanned?	At the end of each night, Vote Center Manager/Assistant Managers will unloads the vote center scanner boxes of ballots and fill out the chain of custody document. Ballots are secured in a sealed box, and will be transported back by Ballot Runners/Managers/Assistant Managers to the Central Counting Place. Vote Center paper ballots are stored in on the north side of the cage (against the fence). On the south side, ballots are stored starting from the eastern section extending towards the western section depending on the step of the process they are in. The north center of the cage shelves are dedicated to envelopes from extracted verified ballots or undeliverable envelopes. The south center of the cage shelves is dedicated to scanned mail ballots. The west side wall of the cage is dedicated to provisional ballots, while the east side wall of the cage is dedicated to discrepant ballots. Central Counting Place ballots are not sealed because of the access needed for staff's periodic audits.
Brianna F. 5/15/2026	Between 4:15p - 4:45p in tabulation room there were 2-3 people working with a laptop at workstation #3. What procedure were they completing? What were the devices used (ibutton) and for what purpose? The laptop - does it move in and out of the tabulation room? Does that laptop leave processing floor? Does that laptop leave county building and if so where does it travel to?	ROV Staff entered the tabulation room to setup the election file from the Election Management System EMS onto the scanners within the central counting place. The ibuttons are used to access the EMS. ROV staff only used the laptop to view instructions on this process. Please note the laptop is not affiliated with the EMS nor was/is connected to the EMS, as it is a county laptop assigned to that staff member.
Roblyn W. 5/18/2026	What do the green and orange badges indicate?	The badges worn by election worker staff in the Central Counting Place indicate that person’s current registered political party. REP - Pink, DEM - Light Blue, NP - Yellow, Green - All Others.
Roblyn W. 5/18/2026	Once the ballots that have returned undeliverable or return to sender labels are noted in the signature verification/bluecrest machines, how are the ballots stored and who removes them from the rolls?	Undeliverable ballots are labeled as such and stored in the ballot cage on shelves that specify they are undeliverable. After the election, the undeliverable ballots are used as reason to initiate the process to inactive the voter pursuant to NRS 293.530.
Brianna F. 5/18/2026	The laptop-does it move in and out of the Tabulation Room? Does that laptop leave the processing floor? Does that laptop leave county building and if so where does it travel to? Additional questions relating to your response and my observations on 5/15/2026: This laptop, you are describing, does it have wi-fi capability or has the ability to communicate without cable connections? Is this laptop assigned specifically to the gentleman who was working on it on Friday, 5/15/2026?	As it is a county laptop assigned to that staff member, it does indeed move in and out of the tabulation room, leave the processing floor, and may travel with the staff member. Yes, it is Wi-Fi capable and connected to the employee internet and yes, it is specifically assigned to that staff member.
Pam S. 5/18/2026	Exactly how is manual signature verification completed? Should we see 2 people at one computer screen together or do they do it seperately. If we can't see 2 people doing it than there is no way to confirm that 2 people looked at it + that it was a bipartisan process.	Once a ballot arrives to manual signature verification, a bi-partisan team reviews the digital capture of the signature on the ballot and compares it to any signature available within the voter's registration. If the bi-partisan team does not agree, a permanent ROV staff member assists in breaking the tie. If it matches, it is accepted and processed. If it does not match, it is challenged and requires a cure.
Roblyn W. 5/20/2026	How does the bluecrest sorter connect with the voter registration system?	The Bluecrest sorter is connected via wire to the "overseer" station on the opposite end of the central counting place. There, staff export data from the sorter onto the workstation - the data will then be uploaded via an FTP to the VREMS system. Data from the VREMS system is pulled via the FTP and is provided back to the sorter. This is done throughout the day as mail ballot envelopes are run through the sorter.
Brianna F. 5/21/26	Yesterday, 5/20/26 approximately 10am, a small group went into the tabulation room. What tasks were they performing? Who were they? Is the bluecrest sorter verifying signatures and if so at what percentage accuracy? Are any ballots being sorted by hand? Where online are observer questions posted?	ROV Staff entered the tabulaton room to prepare the EMS and conduct the portion of Pre-Logic and Accuracy testing that takes place within the central counting place. Our Bluecrest sorter has Automatic Signature Verification enabled - a software that compares the signature to signatures on the voter's file and assigns it a "confidence score". The ROV has set the sorter to automatically signature verify any signatures that meet or are above a 73 confidence score. Ballot envelopes that have trouble being sorted, mostly due to being bent/damaged/soiled, are hand-checked in. Observer question submissions are posted online at washoecounty.gov/voters under the Observation section.
Robyln W. 5/23/2026	Area under "counting board" sign, one worker at the table 4:17pm - I watched a woman doing what looks like extraction. She is removing ballots from one envelope and placing into a second envelope. The first goes into a bin, then into a pile. Is she doing hand extraction? Why taking from one envelope and then placing in a second? Are these mail in ballots? What happens to these ballots next? Wondering also if she is staff and allowed what I think is an iPhone.	This was a staff member processing EASE/UOCAVA duplicated materials. When something has to be duplicated, the original document must be labeled, sealed, and stored. These original materials are no longer apart of the process, while the duplicated ballot is prepared for scanning. In your specific scenario, a staff member removed a UOCAVA paper printed ballot from its original envelope, and stored it in a duplicated ballot envelope. Staff are allowed to have their phones on their persons, though we recommend them to leave their personal phones elsewhere before entering the Central Counting Place. Personal phones are not allowed to be used, while County assigned phones are allowed to be used.
Valerie W. 5/24/2026	Is there anything that can be done to address the air quality and temperature in the Elections Department Observation Room? This containment room is neither safe nor comfortable for observers and hasn't been since its construction. There is no fresh air circulation in the room. Air from outside the room only enters when the single entry door briefly opens to let someone enter or exit. Per the Registrar’s rules, the door cannot be left open or even cracked, so the room's air remains completely sealed. The HVAC ceiling register doesn't appear to be functional. In the many hours I've observed while restricted to the room without windows, I've never felt air moving out of the register. I attempted to catch your eye last night when you were in the processing room, so you could verify that the temperature inside the observation room was too warm. You didn't respond. Earlier, I had also asked "Zach" to ask you to come to the observation room. You didn't over the entire evening. I’m attaching a photo I took at about 8:15 p.m. on May 23, 2026, showing the thermometer reading in the room - 78-80 degrees F. I brought the thermometer with me to specifically document the air and temperature conditions since the air quality and temperature in the Observation Room have been uncomfortable for far too long over several elections. This is not a single event. The temperature held steady at that high level for hours. I was present in the room from roughly 5:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., and another observer stayed even longer—from about 2:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. Only the two of us were in the room during that time, but additional observers' bodies raise the temperature even more. None of the machinery in the processing room were used until approximately 8:30 PM, so equipment heat did not cause the issue. Recommended workplace temperatures generally fall between 68°F and 76°F if supplied with fresh air. Good indoor air quality also requires comfortable humidity levels and a steady supply of fresh outdoor air. The Observation Room does not have consistent fresh air available. Also, the HVAC ceiling register never has shown any detectable air movement, fresh-air supply, or temperature regulation during any of my visits to observe ballot processing during any election. I've kept fruitlessly hoping that the observation room's air and temperature issues would be addressed. I'm finally requesting action. Expecting observers to remain in that environment for any period of time is unreasonable and inconsiderate. It raises the question: Is Registrar Andrew Macdonald unintentionally (or intentionally) discouraging public oversight of ballot processing or attempting to limit transparency? Your prompt attention to this matter and any steps taken to improve ventilation and temperature control in the room will be appreciated. Please let me know if you need additional information or photos.	The Central Counting Place experiences increases in temperature due to machinery operated and amount of staff present within the room. The ballot processing floor and the observation booth are subject to the same temperature conditions, and the HVAC is functioning in both rooms. We are aware of the increases in temperature over the weekend due to the volume of work being done, and will continue to do our best to accommodate both staff and observers. While I (the Public Information Officer) do my best to be available to discuss with observers, other duties require my focus during the election and there should be no expectation that I am able to be summoned to the observation area at any moment's notice. As always, myself and Registrar McDonald encourage the public to observe the process.
Valerie W. 5/25/2026	Please provide the following information regarding mechanical devices to be tested for this 2026 Primary Election (NRS293B.150, NRS293B.155, NRS293B.165, NRS293B.170): 1) Names and party affiliation of the accuracy certification board (ACB). 2) Name of the individual who is not an employee of the county or city. 3) Were all members of the ACB present to observe all testing? 4) Please provide the date and time when the testing began. 5) Which employee(s) under the supervision of Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald conducted the testing? 6) Please provide the date and time when testing concluded. 7) Will all scanners presently located in the Ballot Processing Room be used in this 2026 Primary? 8) Have all scanners to be used in the 2026 Primary been tested? 9) Did all devices successfully pass the testing? If not, how many did not pass? Please identify the specific device(s) that did not pass. 10) Did the ACB members sign any documentation regarding the testing completion and accuracy? If so, please provide a copy of the document. Please indicate the date and time the documents were signed by the ACB member. If voters are to believe that the ACB members are attesting to the accuracy of the testing, citizens deserve to know who is attesting to those facts. Date and time of signing should be documented to comply with NRS regarding the time constraints.	Pre-Logic and Accuracy testing began on May 11th at 8am and continued through May 21st until end of day, conducted by Registrar of Voters staff and temporary workers, and Washoe County staff. The certification by our duly appointed Washoe County Elections Accuracy Certification Board took place on May 21st. The 3 certification board members observed the testing operations in the warehouse on May 15th and then observered testing at the Central Counting Place on May 21st. The 3 members of the certification board are Molly Rosen (DEM - City of Reno), Michelle Harper (REP - City of Sparks), and Heidi Howe (NP - Washoe County). As required by NRS 293B.150, all scanners have been tested - and all systems have passed the test.
Roblyn W. 5/25/2026	I see workers at the counting tables bundle 10 envelopes together then use a large black zip tie on them and add a lime green tag to the bundle. Please help me understand what envelopes these are - inner or outer, why are they ziptied, and what happens to them next.	The "counting board" is a step within the Life of a Ballot where staff takes account of the ballots and envelopes that were processed through extraction. The materials extracted are evaluated, and a count of ballots ready to pass onto scanning takes place. If the ballot is damaged, or has an identifying mark, it is separated out to the next step required. The envelopes are zip tied, as a form of seal, and stored, while the ballots are batched and prepared to scan.
Brianna F. 5/27/26	Today, between 11am-12pm. I saw a staff member on the mail in ballot processing floor, carry a large round key chain with numerous small black rectangular devices that resembled external flash drives. (maybe 5 or 6). This keychain was passed from one staff member to another. What are these devices and what are they used for? Where are they securely stored? Do they travel in and out of the processing floor and If so where? and where are they used outside? Are they used in the ems/tabulation room and for what purpose? Are these devices used to access the election management system. Under what supervision are they used?	Access to the voter registration system (otherwise known as VREMS or TotalVote), requires the use of multi factor authentification (MFA). The keychain you saw holds hardware security keys used to log in to the various workstations in the Central Counting Place that access the voter registration system. They are not storage devices, and are not used to access anything within the Election Management System. This keychain is secured within the Central Counting Place. The keychain is used under ROV staff supervision.
Brianna F. 5/27/26	Did all scanners pass the pre lat test? What day did the pre lat testing begin and what day was it completed? Can you please provide dates and times?	Pre-Logic and Accuracy testing began on May 11th at 8am and continued through May 21st until end of day, conducted by Registrar of Voters staff and temporary workers, and Washoe County staff. The certification by our duly appointed Washoe County Elections Accuracy Certification Board took place on May 21st. The 3 certification board members observed the testing operations in the warehouse on May 15th and then observered testing at the Central Counting Place on May 21st. The 3 members of the certification board are Molly Rosen (DEM - City of Reno), Michelle Harper (REP - City of Sparks), and Heidi Howe (NP - Washoe County). As required by NRS 293B.150, all scanners have been tested - and all systems have passed the test.
Roblyn W. 5/27/2026	Why did two black trays get delivered into the processing room through the staff door to the lobby? Where did they come from? What ballots were they? Where will they processed next?	The Registrar's office has a mail ballot drop box in the lobby that is emptied every night and its contents are brought to the Central Counting Place through the office door. These ballots require chain of custody procedures as any other ballot delivery method, and are not treated any differently than other deliveries from other dropboxes or the USPS. The other type of ballots that may flow through the door are "counter ballots", which are simply mail ballots printed in-house at the request of a voter. They sit at the front office to be delivered to the individual, but if they are not picked up by closing those counter ballots must be brought back to be stored within the Central Counting Place until the following day.
Brianna F. 5/27/26	1. There seems to be a large number of undeliverable ballots at manual signature verification. I assume these are undeliverable because of the yellow postal sticker on the envelopes. Why would so many come back undeliverable? How many undeliverables have been received as to late? 2. Are members of the media allowed to unpack equipment bags at the ballot sorting table? It looked like today they were setting up next to a black tray. Did that contain ballots? Is media allowed to walk processing floor with large duffle/equipment bags? 3. Is the Bluecrest sorter machine verifying signatures today? If so, what % accuracy is this set to? 4. This morning, the security guard noticed the backdoor to garage was not shut and locked (around 9am). Could you please add a live stream view of the backdoor and please leave lights on 24/7? There were no security guards present in processing room during ballot delivery from post office this morning. 5. The staff member who performed daily maintenance this morning wears a small black rectangular device on his hip. What is this? 6. Could you please turn on the tabulation room lights? 7. I saw someone on processing floor with what looked to be 2 phones in their back pockets. Are personal cell phones allowed on processing floor? Do the county issued phones travel out of the building and home with staff?
Julie B. 5/30/2026	I was wondering what the 2 people were doing in the EMS room between 10am-11:00am?	ROV staff entered the EMS room to access our Secure File Transfer System with the NVSOS’s office to receive our bi-monthly Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) reports. Please note the secure file transfer system, otherwise known as the IPSwitch, is a separate system from the voting system and is not interconnected.
Valerie W. 5/30/2026	Given that the public and ballot processing observers have been told by Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald and Media Specialist George Guthrie that Washoe County’s Election Department staff wear colored badges indicating party affiliation on the NV Voter Registration rolls: Blue=Democrat, Green=Minor parties, Red=Republican, Yellow=Nonpartisan. #1: Why should observers or any member of the public trust or believe that the badge color a worker wears when working in the ballot processing room (BPR) is accurate or true? #2: Do workers sign an affidavit regarding the truth of the badge color they wear? #3: Do supervisors attest to the truthfulness of a worker’s badge color? #4: How can observers or the public know with certainty that workers aren’t simply wearing a badge color for the convenience of supervisors in the BPR who need to give the appearance of bipartisan representation? Voter registrations can be legally changed daily. #5: Is the public being asked to simply “trust the department’s operation” regarding bipartisan representation in the processing of ballots when there is no possibility of verification and no penalties for deceitful workers and/or supervisors? #6: Why is it that since the beginning of public observation during this election that, after approximately 14 days of observation, and approximately 100-125 workers doing work in the BPR throughout these days, less than ~20 Republican election workers total have been observed working in the BPR. Public observers have been watching workers in the BPR for the large majority of processing hours since May 15 either in person or online (YouTube) and have gathered these approximations. *See #1 above regarding no possible verification of the truthfulness of the badge color being worn. Party affiliation is critically important per statute and common sense. “Bipartisan” pairs of Democrat and Nonpartisan workers disenfranchise Republican constituents when ballot duplication, adjudication, signature verification, and more are being done. See #1 above; #7: I’ve previously asked you why Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald has not done more to bring a better balanced representation of the 3 major political parties into the Elections Department BPR. You told me, “Republican county employees willing to do election work (for personal paid time off) are hard to find.” Researching this issue more, I’ve learned via confidential conversations with past/present employees that Republican or conservative employees hide their political party affiliation to avoid harassment and discrimination in the largely Democrat county and city workplace. Your comment and the confidential speakers’ comments align. The public and voters expecting a fair and honest election lose in this situation as a fair and honest election is likely not being conducted given the imbalance of party representation. I’m asking Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald to address this discriminatory and possibly illegal situation that plainly circumvents the intent of legislation regarding bipartisan representation.